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Abstract 
The focus of this study is to reflect on the political and cultural climate 
surrounding the Senate’s approval (on 25 February 2016) of the draft law on civil 
unions and de facto unions, known as the Cirinnà law after the Senator (Monica 
Cirinnà) that presented it. The draft law was passed in a vote of confidence and will 
now return to the Chamber of Deputies. It was approved on 11 May by the Chamber 
of Deputies, without further modification.  
The events surrounding the approval of the draft law are an excellent touchstone 
for understanding the political and cultural climate in which it evolved. They reveal 
much about the level of sensitivity of civil society towards an issue – same-sex unions 
– that raises significant questions about the nature of the relationship between rights 
and obligations, new family configurations and parental responsibilities. 
The law will inevitably have effects that we must ponder and discuss in our 
capacity as sociologists. 
 
Keywords: civil unions, homosexuality, surrogate motherhood. 
                                                     
1 When young children ask their parents ‘How was I born?’, adults reply ‘I found 
you under a cabbage leaf’ (a slightly archaic expression) or ‘the stork brought you’. In 
Central Europe, cabbages were one of the most common crops. Sown in March, they 
sprouted nine months later and provided important nutrition in the (poor) diet of the 
past, especially in winter. Furthermore, like almost all vegetable garden products, 
cabbages were planted, cultivated and harvested by women. The expression ‘I found 
you under a cabbage leaf’ gave children the impression of a random encounter with 
their mothers, who gathered them up like a gift of nature and took them in. 
* Department of Human Sciences, University of Verona (Italy). 
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1.  Background2 
Until around twenty years ago, the debate about new family forms in Italy 
concentrated on the recognition of certain rights and prerogatives for 
heterosexual de facto unions with the aim of achieving equality between 
families with married and unmarried couples, many of whom have children.  
Although not dramatic, the increase in de facto unions raises the 
contrasting problems of overriding art. 29 of the Italian Constitution, which 
defines ‘the family as a natural society founded on matrimony’3, and providing 
full protection for any children born from these unions.   
Given the extreme difficulty of amending the Constitution, many local 
councils introduced registers that de facto families could freely sign up to, 
mainly to prevent discrimination in terms of access to certain services. 
However, this was never a politically painless procedure, as certain elements 
of political society – above all, the majority of Catholics and right-wingers – 
saw it as effectively creating parity between de facto unions and families 
founded on matrimony. Their main objection was that if cohabitation was a 
free political, ideological and cultural choice, the recognition of de facto 
unions was a form of state control that such couples should refuse to accept. 
If their choice was not motivated by strong ideological and cultural reasons, 
                                                     
2 The approval of the Cirinnà draft law on civil unions and de facto families gave 
me the opportunity to reflect on the political and cultural climate in Italy surrounding 
the proclamation of the most important laws concerning the family, parenthood, 
procreation and adoption. For almost forty years, laws promulgated in Italy have had 
a profound impact on people’s affective and family life in a cultural climate 
characterized by a significant drop in the level of citizen participation in debated 
issues. Bearing in mind the current literature, I decided to develop my personal 
assessment of the issues under discussion, also on the strength of my long-standing 
experience of study and research in the field of the sociology of the family. The 
reference literature is listed in the bibliography. In the light of these premises, the 
article was submitted for open peer review rather than double-blind peer review (the 
process used by the journal) and was read by three experts: Carla Facchini, a 
sociologist of the family at the University of Milano-Bicocca, Federica De Cordova, a 
social psychologist at the University of Verona and Luciano Nicolini, a lecturer in 
social statistics at the University of Modena and editor of "Cenerentola", Mensile 
Libertario. Paola Di Nicola thanked colleagues for suggestions, many of which have 
been collected. The author, however, are fully responsible for what is written and 
argued. 
3 The constitutional formulation is contradictory: if the family is a natural society, 
it cannot be founded on matrimony (which is a cultural phenomenon), while if it is 
founded on matrimony, it cannot be a natural society (given that marriage does not 
exist in nature).  
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they could easily get married and enjoy the ‘privileges’ guaranteed by 
matrimony4.  
For such couples, cohabitation was a particular handicap in the event of 
conflict or the death of one partner, as the economically weaker or surviving 
partner could not make any claims in areas such as inheritance rights in these 
situations. Also in general terms, there was no recognition in everyday life of 
the relationship of mutual care and solidarity established within the couple, 
such as the right to visit a partner in prison, the right to be informed of the 
state of health or to voicing the last wishes of the partners (if he is dead or in a 
coma). The situation for protecting the rights of minors was different, both 
regarding succession and continuity of care: in addition to the first forms of 
recognition granted in law 151/175 (new family law), which made it possible 
to establish ties of consanguinity between a mother and a father even if they 
were unmarried or married to other individuals, law no. 219 was added in 
2012, establishing kinship ties between the minor and all those descending 
from the same ‘stock’. A child born to unmarried parents can now inherit 
from grandparents, uncles and aunts, while grandparents do not lose the right 
to see their grandchildren if the parents separate. Furthermore, if the child is 
orphaned, grandparents, uncles and aunts can serve as guardians and foster 
parents.5 
                                                     
4 There are three types of marriage in Italy: civil marriage (celebrated before a 
civil registrar), religious marriage with a religious rite celebrated by a priest (the so-
called concordat marriage) and religious marriage without civil effects. While the latter 
type has always been extremely rare, there has been a consistent reduction in 
concordat marriages over the last few decades as a result of the secularisation 
processes in our society. While all marriages can be declared null and void due to 
invalidating defects (with the marital status of the spouses reverting to single, as if the 
marriage had never been celebrated, allowing them to remarry in church), the effects 
of the sacrament do not cease in concordat marriages, so divorcees no longer have 
access to certain sacraments (such as communion) and cannot remarry in church (in 
the case of concordat and religious marriages).   
5 The promulgation of law no. 219/2012, which eliminated any unequal 
treatment of children born to married and cohabiting parents, was more the result of 
support from female MPs from across the political spectrum than the outcome of 
wide-ranging and in-depth cultural and political debate. Regardless of their political 
affiliation, they agreed about the need to protect children irrespective of the marital 
status of their parents. Through law 219, the protection of children born outside 
marriage moved from the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court to that of the Ordinary 
Court (like children born to married parents), which continues to be responsible for 
custody matters in cases of parental inadequacy (whether the couples are married or 
not).   
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With the advent of the third millennium, the debate on new families 
changed tone completely, with the main focus shifting to the recognition of 
same-sex couples. LGBT movements and homosexual parent associations 
gained more visibility, claiming the right to parenthood, the right to get 
married and the right to adopt a same-sex partner’s child. These requests and 
claims are set against a backdrop of cohabitation being accepted (it is no 
longer discriminated against in everyday life) and attitudes towards 
homosexuals and homosexuality that vary between indifference (it’s their 
business), embarrassment (sex should be kept out of the public debate), 
intolerance (some behaviour by homosexuals causes annoyance, such as 
public displays of affection) and clear forms of homophobia (discrimination, 
avoidance, contempt, verbal and physical aggression and so on).  
Some intellectuals started to adopt a supportive stance towards the new 
movements claiming the right to non-discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation: as art. 29 of the Italian Constitution states that the family is a 
natural society founded on matrimony, if natural implies that humans are by 
nature inclined to establish lasting, stable and socially recognized ties, then 
homosexuals – in the name of their natural inclination – should be able to get 
married like heterosexuals and have and raise children.  
The emphasis placed – at least in Italy – on the request for the right to 
adopt children and partner’s child overshadows one of the theories most 
fervently endorsed by other LGBT movements. They criticize marriage as an 
institution designed for procreation and as such heterosexual; its strength and 
durability is based on the purely cultural reproduction of stereotypes of 
couples, which are entirely separate from the biological difference between 
men and women. It is effectively a rejection of marriage as an institution 
designed for the maintenance of gender stereotypes and the procreation of 
children. 
 
2.  The Law 
Approved on 25 February 2016, the Cirinnà draft law provided an 
opportunity for a heated political clash, giving rise to the construction and 
deconstruction of political alliances in the space of a few days. Following a 
request for numerous amendments, the government removed the reference to 
adoption partner’s child6 from the text and called for a vote of confidence, 
                                                     
6 The Cirinnà draft law contains no reference to the adoption in general, but only 
the possibility of adopting the children of partners. 
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meaning that the law was approved without any further debate. The law was 
finally approved on 11 May 2016, again without any debate in parliament. 
The law was essentially a mandatory act to avoid further reprimands from 
Strasbourg, prompting opposing factions to take action (and take to the 
streets) with the (Catholic) defenders of the so-called ‘traditional’ family and 
Church leaders on one side and the champions of individual rights on the 
other side: feminist movements, LGBT movements, homosexual family 
associations and citizens fighting against any form of rights-based 
discrimination.  
The climate was extremely heated in parliament too, characterized by 
statements that were often unrelated to the context (for example, ‘surrogate 
motherhood is a crime that should be punished by life imprisonment’, 
‘surrogate motherhood is an abomination, a form of prostitution’, ‘babies 
can’t be bought’, ‘homosexuals are paedophiles’, ‘homosexuals have a 
promiscuous sex life’ and so on).  There were frequent references to surrogate 
motherhood, which is illegal in Italy, as if it were somehow legitimized by the 
prospect of granting homosexual couples the right to adopt a partner’s child.  
However, despite the animated tones, insults and inaccuracies, the law was 
passed. Regardless of whether it was seen in a positive light or not, it made 
civil unions an extremely similar institution to marriage. 
The law consists of two parts: the first regarding civil unions (same-sex 
couples) and the second concerning de facto unions (heterosexual couples).  
With regard to civil unions, the law refers to art. 2 of the Constitution, 
where ‘the Republic recognizes and guarantees the inviolable rights of the 
person, both as an individual and in the social groups7 where human 
personality is expressed’ and ‘expects that the fundamental duties of political, 
economic and social solidarity be fulfilled’8. Starting from this principle, the 
new social formation (civil union) of same-sex couples recognizes rights of 
property, inheritance and pensions, and duties of mutual material and moral 
assistance and cohabitation equivalent to those established for a married 
heterosexual couple. Two individuals of the same sex can constitute a civil 
union in the presence of a civil registrar and two witnesses. They can also 
decide to adopt a common surname. 
As mentioned above, individuals in same-sex civil unions cannot adopt 
their partner’s children (although not in absolute terms, as the decision is 
                                                     
7 Social formations are human aggregations which reflect an individual’s need for 
social relations. Social formations include private bodies (whether for profit or not), 
school, political parties, trade unions, local communities, religious confessions and 
first and foremost the family. 
8 The legislator avoided referring to art. 29 of the Italian Constitution. 
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delegated to a magistrate who decides on a case-by-case basis)9 and are not 
bound by the obligation of fidelity. This last element was requested by a 
politician who wanted to underline – with disdain – the supposedly 
promiscuous nature of a homosexual’s affective and sexual life.  
There are only a few new features for de facto unions, which are 
formalized before a notary rather than a civil registrar. A heterosexual couple 
(both unmarried) can stipulate a cohabitation agreement that does not provide 
for inheritance or a survivor’s pension, but imposes the obligation to offer 
solidarity and mutual support. In the event of conflict, there is optional 
alimony for the economically weaker partner.  
Rather than representing an attack on the institution of marriage, the 
Cirinnà draft law strengthens the marriage contract, since it confirms the 
principle that from the private ties of affection and love can’t arise reciprocal 
rights and duties. 
 
 
3. After the law 
 
Although many representatives of LGBT movements and some politicians 
have promised to present further draft laws to introduce adoption, we should 
not so much speculate on their future actions as ask what will or might 
happen as a result of such a law, especially with regard to the protection of 
children and the new forms of parental responsibility.  
As sociologists, we must deal with numerous questions: 
- Is our civil society mature enough to give ‘sensible’ answers to a series of 
questions that will be raised by the regulation of such unions and, above all, 
the right to adopt? And will such answers be able to take account of the 
different positions that have already emerged? 
- Are the forms that parental responsibility can assume in lesbian or gay 
couples comparable and, above all, are they equally acceptable and accepted in 
symbolic and cultural terms? 
- How can a parent’s desire to have a child at any cost and by any means be 
reconciled with a child’s right to have access to his or her origins? 
 
                                                     
9 On the basis of the principle of safeguarding the quality of relations and 
emotional continuity for children, in practice some magistrates have allowed a 
partner’s children to be adopted even in the case of same-sex couples. The principle 
of safeguarding emotional continuity forms the basis of Law no.173/2015, which 
allows foster families to apply to adopt a child in their care, especially in cases of long-
term foster care. 
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Civil society, homosexual rights, medically assisted reproduction, surrogate motherhood 
 
The most significant reforms that affected family and parental 
relationships in Italy date back to the 1970s. The decade started with the 
introduction of divorce in 1970, while law no. 151 was promulgated to reform 
family law in 1975 (presenting a structure that differed markedly from 
previous legislation). In 1978, the voluntary interruption of pregnancy was 
regulated by law no. 194, while in 1983, adoption and foster care were 
regulated in new terms by law no.184. The aim of all legislation in this period 
was to eliminate laws that were effectively discriminatory, above all towards 
women and children born out of wedlock. Laws were promulgated to 
safeguard the rights of individuals as opposed to collective rights ascribed to 
specific groups (such as the family founded on marriage, whose unity used to 
be seen as of greater consequence than individual rights). When these laws 
were approved, the parliamentary debates were similarly heated, featuring 
opposing factions and parties (on the left and right) that felt they were acting 
on the basis of a mandate from civil society. The failure of attempts to 
abrogate the laws on divorce and the regulation of abortion shows that civil 
society was also sensitive to the introduction of laws with a greater focus on 
protection. However, it was not so much (and not only) individual rights that 
were safeguarded as the right of self-determination: being able to make 
decisions and choices about certain strictly personal and private aspects of life. 
This was all in accordance with ethical and cultural pluralism: some rights 
were granted and expanded without detracting from those with different 
ethical orientations.  
The events surrounding the approval of the draft law on civil unions 
reflect a completely different society.  
In addition to referencing the opinions of Catholics and LGBT 
movements, the opposing stances voiced in the chaotic and disorderly 
parliamentary debate were more an opportunity to measure and evaluate 
agreements and majorities than a chance to represent the interests of an 
absent civil society.  
I use the term absent, because the arrival of the Cirinnà draft law in 
parliament was sudden in many respects, addressing delicate and complex 
issues that are not easy to grasp10. 
The split between politics and citizens can also be seen when political and 
parliamentary discussions start to feature issues and problems that involve few 
                                                     
10 The regulation of civil unions had been included in the political agenda by 
Matteo Renzi: but the parliamentary debate was seen as sudden as it was not thought 
that elects constitute one of the priorities of the country. 
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people and are complex, as they embrace concepts such as the value of life, 
the meaning of birth and death, genetic manipulation and the control that 
man can exert over nature.  
Many Italians became familiar with the expression ‘step child adoption’ 
(used in English in newspapers and other media), which became ‘purchased 
children’ in the collective imagination, creating a state of confusion which only 
succeeded in clouding the issue.  
A similar situation arose with the approval of law no.40 in 2004, which 
regulated medically assisted procreation. Highly restrictive and penalizing to 
women, this law was literally taken apart by the Constitutional Court, which 
demonstrated the unlawfulness of its most important articles11. The left 
promoted a referendum to abrogate the law in 2005, but as only 25.9% of 
Italians with the right to vote participated, the quorum was not reached and 
the law remained, even though the Constitutional Court ruled that its most 
significant articles were unconstitutional12.  
Is it a question of indifference, indolence or inability on the part of the 
civil society to express ideas on what is meant by good and just? It is clear that 
the current pervasive individualistic and consumerist utilitarianism does not 
favour reflection about the concept of common good. However, the issues 
that arise are both numerous and complex: in their small way, LGBT 
movements have raised the major question of the boundaries between nature 
and culture, between medicine as treatment and medicine as an instrument for 
enhancing and manipulating human beings. These problems are unavoidable 
unless we accept the principle that everything which is technically possible is 
ipso facto right: an asset to society and the individual. 
It is hoped and expected that civil society in its various forms will be able 
to open a debate on these issues without sheltering behind frequently 
ideological opposing positions. It may seem reductive, but the truth lies 
somewhere in the middle; it is here that men and women are called to make 
meaningful choices and decisions.  
 
                                                     
11  The law, which considers surrogate motherhood and heterologous 
fertilization unlawful, established that no more than three fertilized ova could be 
prepared and had to be implanted at the same time, even constituting a risk to the 
mother’s health. It also prohibited pre-implantation diagnosis, even if the couple used 
medically assisted fertilization to avoid passing a serious genetic disease on to the 
child. These restrictions were declared unconstitutional and therefore eliminated.  
12 This created a legislative gap that does not help doctors and couples tackle the 
problem of infertility, raising the issue of the need to legislate on medically assisted 
maternity to prevent reproductive tourism and combat the speculative approach of 
private clinics. 
Paola Di Nicola 
Babies are not Born under a Cabbage Leaf 
301 
Same-sex couples: maternity and paternity in the social imaginary 
 
With regard to same-sex couples, are men and women equal in common 
sense perception? If they have children, are men and women granted equal 
parental competencies and abilities? 
We need to make some preliminary remarks before answering these 
questions.  
First of all, we must distinguish between same-sex couples with children 
born from previous heterosexual unions and homosexual couples that want to 
have a child. 
In the former case, the issue is to forestall the danger of the child being 
removed or put into the custody of the other biological parent because of the 
couple’s supposed inability to fulfil their parental responsibilities competently 
and create a living environment that is not detrimental to the child’s 
development and a source of discrimination. However, given the importance 
of the permanence and continuity of affective relations for children and as 
many maintain that children who live with homosexual couples do not exhibit 
significantly different problems from those in heterosexual families, there is 
no great danger of a child being removed from a de facto household. For 
these couples, the issue of children being adopted by the other same-sex 
partner does not arise, as they have both biological parents, both of whom 
usually fulfil their parental responsibilities13.  
The situation is more complex for same-sex couples that want a child. 
Above all, there are also different attitudes towards gay and lesbian couples in 
common sense perception.  
Generally speaking, there is more social tolerance of female homosexuality 
because it is less ostentatious and perhaps because sexuality might still (even 
though times have changed) be considered an area of life that women do not 
prioritize. As a result, two women living together are rarely a cause of scandal, 
disapproval or even suspicion. Furthermore, women in turn have a much 
more tolerant and open-minded attitude towards homosexuality – even 
between men – than men themselves do (see ISTAT data, 2011). 
Although common throughout history, male homosexuality began to cause 
problems when homosexuals started to express their emotional bond with 
another man on an exclusive basis (also as a result of the spread of the 
                                                     
13 Although joint custody has existed in Italy since 2006 (law no. 54), in reality 
the majority of children of a separated or divorced heterosexual couple live with their 
mother on a daily basis. Therefore, even in cases where the mother starts a 
cohabitation relationship with another woman, the female line of material and 
affective care is not actually questioned or interrupted.  
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romantic love complex from the female to the male world) and express their 
disaffection with or rejection of heterosexual ties. The birth of movements 
LGBT highlighted the changes in the character and orientation of male 
sexuality, which was no longer the active practice of ‘penetration and 
possession’ of a woman (who is considered passive, accommodating and 
submissive, a cliché that is still alive and well). These men were seen as having 
failed to fulfil their biological and cultural mandate of sexual superiority over 
women, as if they had effectively renounced their masculinity. This explains 
why male homosexuality is strongly stigmatized and vilified in cultural terms, 
above all by heterosexual men expressing narrow-mindedness, repugnance 
and fear of contamination. This hostility is extremely strong among men with 
low levels of schooling and elderly population, for whom sexual identity (the 
traditional model based on domination of women) often plays a pivotal role in 
the construction of self-perception and social self-placement.  
Another necessary premise to grasp the social and cultural differences in 
assessing a female or a male same-sex couple’s desire for a child concerns the 
living environment experienced by children in their first years of life.  
In the past, children were a woman’s issue until they were seven or eight: 
mothers, aunts, nannies, maids, servants and so on were in charge of children 
in aristocratic, middle-class and working-class families alike. Men were on the 
outskirts of this all-female world.  
In many respects, a lesbian couple that wants a child is expressing a desire 
that we culturally associate with the female realm. Furthermore, one of the 
women in the couple becomes pregnant and gives birth to the child: whether 
she uses artificial insemination or heterosexual intercourse, she is nevertheless 
the child’s biological mother. Therefore, there is an indisputable biological 
bond within the couple; the mother can subsequently assess whether or not it 
is opportune to allow her partner to adopt the child (which is starting to 
happen quite frequently).  
Instead, a male couple’s desire for a child tends to be interpreted as the 
feminization of the male. Above all, as neither of them can ‘become pregnant’, 
they need to resort to surrogate motherhood to realize their dream.  
To fulfil this desire, a homosexual couple is forced to make choices that 
raise a wide variety of issues ranging from the ethical dimension to the 
relationship with nature, the culture of individual rights and limits on the 
control and manipulation of nature and man as a biological ‘body’. 
This explains why the key bone of contention in the approval of the 
Cirinnà draft law was the request for homosexual men to be able to adopt a 
partner’s children, which, as we have seen, always brings up the subject of 
surrogate motherhood. However, surrogate motherhood raises ethical 
problems about the nature of the relationship between mother and child, as it 
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calls into question the widely-ascertained idea that pregnancy already 
constitutes a mother-child relationship with repercussions on both the 
woman-mother and child-offspring. We do not know whether or not this 
relationship can develop if the mother receives another woman’s fertilized 
ova, but it is her body that is modified during pregnancy: the placenta belongs 
to the woman making her uterus available, while the heartbeat that the baby 
hears belongs to the surrogate mother14.  
 
Surrogate motherhood: the state of the art 
 
Surrogate motherhood is an illegal practice in many countries (such as 
Italy), in Britain is subject to some constraints, in other countries is permitted 
only for altruistic rather than commercial purposes (like Canada). However, it 
is legal in countries such as Russia, Ukraine and India and states like 
California, and unregulated in many African nations and parts of Latin 
America. 
The map of the spread of the practice shows that it is relatively common – 
beyond and despite the bans – above all among infertile heterosexual couples. 
This has given rise to a wide range of research and studies analysing the 
resulting implications, which are social as well as psychological and personal, 
as they relate to some of the cornerstones of the functioning of social systems: 
the role of women, new forms of parenthood, limits on individual freedom, 
processes of gender not-differentiation and, above all, relations between rich 
and poor nations.  
Many studies have focused on so-called reproductive tourism, which leads 
to strong polarisation between Western countries that ‘buy’ their reproductive 
potential and poorer countries whose women lend themselves to completing a 
pregnancy for others for a fee. It is described as a new form of ‘colonialism’ 
that intensifies not only the differences but also the potential social conflict 
between countries. Indeed, processes of globalisation (that make reproductive 
tourism easily accessible) tend to generate more divergence than convergence 
among nations.  
Starting from the broader and more consolidated phenomenon of the sale 
of organs (once again from poorer countries), other studies see the spread of 
surrogate motherhood (which is almost always lucrative) as a sign of further 
acceleration of the processes of social and income polarization in a country 
between the rich (who can ‘buy’ health and children) and the poor who have 
                                                     
14 The problem of the link that can be established between surrogate mother and 
baby during pregnancy arises, of course, also in the case in which heterosexual couples 
recourse to this type of maternity. 
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no access to such opportunities. It is underlined that new medical procedures 
have actually neutralized the word ‘donation’, which is still closely associated 
in common sense perception with a solidarity-based exchange that does not 
create dependency or obligations (least of all of a monetary nature) between 
the donor and the recipient.  
With their decades of commitment to the cause of a woman’s right to 
control her own body, most feminist movements adopt a clear and steadfast 
stance15. They see surrogate motherhood as a form of commodification of a 
woman’s body, reverting to the definition of female identity as a biological 
container that prevented women from fully participating in public social life 
for centuries16. This concept of women as containers helped to create the 
long-held idea of maternity as merely a biological function rather than a 
burgeoning area of the ethics of care, responsibility and identity relations.  
Last but not least, there are studies in the field of moral philosophy that 
see surrogate motherhood as the latest expression of human hubris 
(arrogance, hauteur, presumption): the desire to gain power, control nature 
and challenge the natural constraints that often appear in the body in the form 
of illness, weakness, lack of self-sufficiency, impotence, physical ugliness, 
intellectual disability, infertility and the final challenge (yet to be won!) of 
death.  
To this end, in his book The Case against Perfection, Michael Sandel highlights 
that there are fine lines in the medical and biological sciences between therapy 
(to treat illness) and enhancement (often pharmacological, but also genetic) of 
the body and its performance (for example in the world of sport), between 
treating infertility and resorting to medically assisted maternity to have a child, 
and between having preimplantation genetic diagnosis to identify any genetic 
risks to the baby and ‘selecting’ features of a child that are deemed positive: 
sex, height, eye colour and so on.  
                                                     
15 During the debate on the Cirinnà law, some feminists in Italy adopted a less 
critical stance regarding surrogate motherhood, which would only be lawful if driven 
by altruism or female solidarity. However, it is always extremely difficult to distinguish 
between women who offer their wombs in exchange for money and those who do it 
out of love or solidarity. Furthermore, it is well to remember that what is right is not 
necessarily good and that what is good is not necessarily right.  
16 According to the Aristotelian tradition, women – like slaves – were too close 
to nature (seen as the world of constraints) and biological reproduction. As a result, 
they could not access the male-dominated top echelons of social and public life 
(which was the realm where freedom was exercized). The condition by which men 
exercized freedom was based on their freedom from material constraints (such as 
working in order to eat). 
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The boundaries are blurred and often transgressed as reproduction has 
become ‘big business’ in the world of infertility treatment, which the higher 
social classes usually benefit from. Furthermore, the use of heterologous 
insemination and surrogate motherhood inevitably leads to the ‘selection’ of 
the best goods. To avoid affective and legal complications, a ‘healthy’ woman 
is chosen who is capable of completing the pregnancy and whose womb is 
used to implant ova most probably ‘donated’ by healthy and beautiful women 
and fertilized with the sperm of an equally healthy and handsome man (if not 
the biological father). Care is taken that there are no biological ties between 
the surrogate mother and foetus: the pregnancy is sterilized so that it is not 
affected by anything natural! In a manner that is undoubtedly less reliable than 
cloning, attempts are made to control the randomness of natural reproduction 
and its subsequent inevitably variable nature.  
 
 
4. Conclusion: Babies are not Born under Cabbage Leaves 
 
The debate that arose surrounding the approval of the Cirinnà draft law 
failed to consider children and their rights; they were seen as the non-random 
results of choices involving adults. Without needing to refer to cases of babies 
‘rejected’ by their non-biological parents for being different from plans and 
expectations, there are real cases (the number of which is irrelevant) of 
children raised by same-sex parents. We need to safeguard the interests of 
these children, ensure that they have affective continuity, assess the quality of 
the relationships they experience on a daily basis and respect their right to 
know about their origins17. This is the real challenge that must be taken up by 
adults – magistrates and parents – involved in situations that raise questions 
and problems different from those elicited by biological parenthood. The 
Italian magistracy has been given responsibility to decide on a case-by-case 
basis if and when to allow the adoption of a child by a biological parent’s 
same-sex partner. This might be a fitting choice in itself, but the fact remains 
that the parents have to bring an action and the magistrate might not be 
favourably inclined towards such requests. Moreover, the process may take a 
considerable time with the decision arriving when the child has already 
‘created’ – for better or worse – a family history.  Rethinking and 
                                                     
17 The protection of children must be the main priority, as the whole debate 
about the recognition of same-sex couples presumes that these partners are bound by 
indissoluble ties and are therefore exempt from conflict and separation. There is 
actually nothing to suggest that these relationships will be for life, whereas the 
parental responsibilities that they assume most definitely are.  
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reformulating the law on adoption to take account of the possible new forms 
of parenthood could be one path to follow to issue laws aimed at simplifying a 
procedure (adoption) that is already too complicated and economically costly  
Surrogate motherhood raises more complex ethical problems of another 
kind: it is the quintessence of the ‘right’ to a child and a child as a right, 
claimed on the basis of a utilitarian and consumerist logic that does not 
recognize the relational nature of the parent-child, mother-child relationship. 
The assumption of responsibility is replaced by the logic of possession, with 
hidden rejection of the uncertainty and open-endedness that are always 
inherent in maternity and paternity: your child is never as you expect! Hoping 
to determine somatic and intellectual features and traits is the expression of a 
desire for power that refuses to accept human – as well as genetic – variability 
and diversity. It is a way of challenging nature, a form of arrogance or hubris 
that used to provoke a reaction and punishment from the gods. It could be 
said that in its current expression, nature is rebelling against man, spinning out 
of his control.  
With regard to the right of children to access their origins, the new forms 
of parenthood make the old tale of babies ‘found under a cabbage leaf’ even 
more obsolete and unusable – in its simplicity, the story referred to the 
‘surprise’ factor of the meeting between parent and child. As a planned 
procedure, surrogate motherhood removes the unpredictable element that 
forms the cornerstone of fecundation and childbirth, and prepares a parent to 
be open to the imponderable, which is the basis for accepting otherness.  
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